

Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service



Post Incident Analysis – #5 Burkett Court

Incident #10-0134583

December 02, 2010

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Introduction

On December 2, 2010 at 0540 hours, units were dispatched for a report of a house fire at #5 Burkett Court in FS19's area. Burkett Ct. is a half mile from FS19 and runs off the 2100 block of Seminary Rd.

The morning was cold and clear. Temperatures were in the upper 30s with no wind and the ground was dry.

The fire, caused by a faulty electric blanket, began in a basement bedroom in the delta quadrant of the home. The occupant noticed the fire and attempted to smother it by throwing blankets on it. Believing she had extinguished the fire, the occupant then opened a window to ventilate the smoke. The fire surged and the occupant retreated to the first floor where she alerted her housemate and the two escaped.

Units from FS19 arrived on the scene to find a "working fire" and began operations. Investigation revealed heavy fire in the basement which quickly spread to the charlie and delta quadrants of both the basement and first floor levels. The bulk of the fire was extinguished within 25 minutes and the last unit cleared the scene at 0945 hours.

Building/Structure Information

The structure is a two story, split foyer, single family dwelling (SFD) of wood frame construction. On Side “A” the basement level is at grade. Due to sloping of the lot, the structure is only one story tall on Side “C”.

The front door (primary entrance) is elevated up a flight of stairs, centered on Side “A”, and enters at the split between the upper and lower levels. A garage door in the alpha quadrant of Side “A” provides direct access to the basement level. French doors on Side “D” provide access to the first or top floor, quadrant charlie. The basement has four windows (two on Side “A”, two on Side “B”). Several of these windows had security bars in place.

The home was equipped with functioning smoke detectors at the time of the fire. There is no monitored alarm system or residential sprinkler system.

Fire Code History

Because this is a single family dwelling there is no Fire Code enforcement history.

Communications

The incident was dispatched at 0540 on 7 Alpha and immediately switched to 7 Charlie for operations. AT719 established command at 05:43 and command was assumed by BC702 at 05:52. Immediately after the transfer of command the fireground was broken down into divisions and groups.

The Incident Commander (IC) controlled the channel for most of the incident. Communications, for the most part, were done through division or group leaders and radio discipline was fair. A single channel was adequate as there was no staging area and no need to communicate with units on other channels. The incident commander had less trouble trying to transmit than on many recent incidents. ECC was provided several updates as the incident progressed.

Pre-emergency Planning

No pre emergency planning had been done on this structure or location.

On Scene Operations

A). Structural Integrity - When units first arrived they found a significant volume of fire in the basement but the structure itself was still sound. This was due to a number of factors: the calling party was awake when the fire started and reported it quickly, the

home is very close to FS19 so response time was minimal, and lastly, the home was constructed of dimensional finished lumber which offers greater resistance to assault by fire before failure. Near the twenty minute mark of operations, the basement division warned that the first floor (division one) would be questionable in quadrant delta. The fire was completely extinguished shortly thereafter so that condition did not deteriorate and crews worked carefully in the area during overhaul.

B). Command - Command was initially established by AT719 and was assumed by BC702 who maintained command throughout the remainder of the incident.

C). Command Post - The stationary command post was identified on the operations radio channel as the Battalion 702 vehicle and the vehicle's rooftop green command light was utilized. The command post was on the alpha/bravo corner with an unobstructed view of the incident.

D). Size Up – AT719 arrived on the scene first. The officer gave an on scene report but did not provide the information required by policy (no type of occupancy, building description, description of conditions found, etc). He assumed command in the “attack mode” and requested the Rapid Intervention Dispatch (RID), but he did not identify a “two out” standby team. Crews began interior operations, ahead of the engine, without this requirement in place. The occupants were known to be out of the house.

E). Additional Apparatus – AT719 requested the RID immediately upon arrival, and a task force was requested by BC702 later in the incident to provide relief for the initial crews.

F). Strategy/Action Plan - Operations at this incident were in the “offensive” mode. The residents were known to be out of the structure so the primary tactical priorities were protecting exposures (the remainder of the house), confinement, and extinguishment.

G). Tactical Execution – Upon arrival, E719 laid out from a hydrant across Seminary Rd from Burkett Ct. The small line man, thinking they had arrived on the scene, got out as well. E719 then pulled into Burkett Ct and positioned on Side “A” of the burning home.

E719's crew struggled with line deployment. The officer called for a 2 inch line but the small line man pulled a 2 1/2 inch. He then had to go back to get another line and, when he did so, he pulled a 300 foot 2 inch line – not the desired cross lay. E719 was within 70 feet of the house and the excess hose was not properly flaked out. When it was charged it lodged beneath the front tires of AT719 and could not be removed. The tower had to be backed off the line to allow for full water flow. The officer had to repeatedly call for more pressure and his engine driver pointed out, over the radio, that there were numerous kinks in the line. E719's driver was also operating in CAFs mode flowing water, air, and foam solution.

While E719 wrestled with their line, AT719's crew had entered the structure and was operating in the foyer and on the steps leading to the basement. The growing fire forced

them out of the house and resulted in damage to one crew member's gear. At this time, 05:52, BC702 assumed command from AT719.

The delay caused by the stretching of the initial attack line allowed the fire to grow significantly and resulted in reduced visibility and significant heat that hampered advancement of the line on the interior. E719's crew could not reach the seat of the fire and withdrew to the outside where they hit the fire through a basement window. E754 pulled a 200 foot, 2 inch, cross lay back-up line from E719 and both crews re-entered once the fire was knocked (along with AT719). Neither unit was able to advance to the seat of the fire and conditions worsened quickly. Sixteen minutes after E719's arrival, and as a result of rapidly deteriorating conditions, command (BC702) directed basement division units to withdraw from the basement. The units had already begun to do so. The fire was then knocked from the outside for the second time utilizing the front basement window. Crews were promptly reassigned to the interior for overhaul.

Truck and rescue squad personnel provided secondary exits for interior crews by clearing the glass and cross members from all but one window. Personnel from RS742 also removed steel crime bars from several of the basement windows and forced open the garage door to allow for emergency egress of personnel if necessary.

Truck personnel threw ladders to the windows on Side "B" as well as several ladders on Side "C" that accessed the roof (no operations were conducted on the roof). Only one ladder was thrown on Side "A" (quadrant alpha) and that ladder went to the roof, not to the bedroom window. The ladder selected was too long to be of use in that window.



The Rapid Intervention Group (RIG) was formed on Side "A" and assisted in identifying hazardous conditions including a badly damaged PEPCO house service.

A701 set up a rehab area in a nearby yard. Personnel exiting the building were directed to report to rehab.

H). Training Needs Identified - This incident revealed several areas that should be addressed by training (see also "Lessons Learned"):

1. Personnel should be trained in, and must understand, how to do a reasonable risk/benefit analysis.

2. Personnel must not operate ahead of, or without the protection of, hose lines unless absolutely necessary.
3. The importance of getting the first attack line in service can not be overstated. Other crews may have to assist the first engine.
4. Personnel need to practice the basics – pulling attack lines, managing hose lines, selecting and throwing ladders, review of CAFs, etc.

I). SOPs – The tenets of the Safe Structural Firefighting Policy were not followed on this incident. First arriving companies did not provide an appropriate on scene report and the “two out” standby team requirement was not met. The policy was adequate for this incident.

J). Offensive/Defensive Modes – As noted above, this fire was fought in an offensive mode. Deteriorating conditions did require command to call for an exterior attack at one point. This action was well communicated on the operations channel, and crews were confirmed to be in areas of safety before the exterior (hand line) attack was commenced.

K). Risk Analysis – Units were notified upon arrival that all residents were out of the structure. This was later confirmed with a search. There was still considerable personal property to be saved. As command, BC702 approached the incident as one where risk to personnel should be low to moderate.

L). Use of Divisions and Groups – Divisions and Groups were used effectively on this incident and were appropriate to the size of the incident. The initial divisions and groups were: basement division (E719, E754, AT719, C705D), division 1 (E701, T716, BC701), search (RS742), and RIG (E705, AT718, RS741B, M701).

M). Apparatus Positioning – This incident occurred in a small court which restricted apparatus access to the first few companies. E719 and AT719 went different ways around the court and both had position on Side “A”. The command post was in an adjacent yard off the alpha/bravo corner with an unhindered view of the incident.



N). Attack Line Selection and Positioning – The officer on E719 called for a 2 inch line but got a 2 ½ inch. His small line man returned to the engine and came back with the 300 foot 2 inch pulled from the rear of E719. Both lines were pulled to the front door, as was the back up line; a cross lay from E719, pulled by E754. Those units used the front door because the garage door, which offered more direct access to the basement, took time to force.

E701 pulled a 300 foot 2 inch line from E701 and advanced it to the first floor entrance on Side “D”. This was the primary attack line on division one.

O). Ventilation – Horizontal ventilation was carried out by the trucks and rescue squad. To my knowledge, the venting was not coordinated with the fire attack. The fire room had been vented by the resident prior to FD arrival. All windows had been or were being removed by the time BC702 arrived. Vertical ventilation was unnecessary.

P). Salvage – Attempts were made to preserve property in the alpha and bravo quadrants which were the only ones not burned. No formal salvage efforts were made and no salvage group was formed.

R). Mutual Aid Companies – E754 performed as required by SOP and completed all tasks assigned by command.

S). Water Supply – Water supply was adequate for the incident with two established sources (the first and second engines had the hydrant on Seminary Rd across from Burkett Ct, and the third and forth had the hydrant at Seminary Rd and Monroe St).

Staging

A task force (E707, E702, T715, Air 716, Canteen 705) was requested but the units were allowed to come to the scene and were promptly assigned. As such, there was no assigned staging area, no staging manager, and no tactical talk group assigned to staging.

Support Functions

A rehab section was established and was monitored by A701 and M701. Personnel were checked for general condition and snacks and drinks were available from Canteen 705. Command considered, but decided against, calling for a bus for shelter. The morning was not particularly cold and the lack of shelter did not appear to adversely affect our personnel. Crews were rotated frequently and were relieved by personnel from the oncoming shift.

PEPCO and Washington Gas were both requested. PEPCO could not isolate the power at the pole due to severe damage to the house service caused by flame impingement. PEPCO isolated the whole court. Gas service was shut off inside the structure and at an outside valve.

The Red Cross was declined. The displaced occupants elected to stay with a neighbor.

Safety Group

AT719 never established a standby team (two out). BC702 did not realize this and simply built out the RIG after his arrival.

The next arriving command officer, BC701, was assigned safety. This was changed several minutes later when Safety 700 arrived. He was assigned safety and BC701 was reassigned to division one.

All safety SOPs were followed. The atmosphere was checked repeatedly, hazards were announced on the radio (soft first floor, damaged PEPCO service, existence of an IDLH), and the safety officer continually made rounds in and around the structure.

The Rapid Intervention Group (RIG) was formed on Side “A” of the structure and was used for RIC purposes until the IDLH atmosphere had been declared safe on all levels by safety. Those units were then used for relief and overhaul.

One firefighter (from WVRS) lacerated his nose while trying to force open a locked garage door on Side “A”, quadrant alpha of the basement level. He was taken to Holy Cross Hospital after the incident by the squad, and was treated and released.

Accountability

Portions of Policy 26-04 “Personnel and Unit Accountability Systems” were not followed on this incident. E719’s officer did not provide an initial accountability report by radio (Unit I.D., number of personnel, location of entry, reason for entry). PAS tags were not collected, although some unit officers brought them to the command post. The status of personnel was monitored by their assignment to groups and divisions. Crew integrity appeared good.

ECC did not provide Incident Duration Reminders (IDRs). The first Personnel Accountability Report (PAR) was initiated by command at 06:28. All personnel were accounted for at that time.

The incident was continuously monitored and controlled by command as well as DC700C who was in the command post.

Investigations

FM55 (Shackett) and FM67 (Boyd) conducted the investigation. The fire was determined to have started in a faulty electric blanket in the basement bedroom in quadrant delta. Interior furnishings and a good supply of air (provided by the window left open by the resident) contributed to the rapid spread of the fire on the basement level.

The volume of fire that spread to the first floor was partially the result of time used to get an attack line in service.



Lessons Learned

1. On this incident, AT719 should have assumed the “two out” function until such time that they could have been relieved of that responsibility by other incoming units. Acting as the “two out” would have allowed E719 to begin their attack in compliance with policy. The time outside could have been spent better preparing the building for entry. Had AT719’s personnel been in the front yard, they likely would have noticed E719 struggling with its attack line and could have rendered assistance.
2. Personnel should not operate without the protection of a charged attack line unless occupants are in need of obvious rescue. On this incident one of the truck companies entered the structure despite knowing that the occupants had escaped the house. Conditions were so poor that they could not get off the stairs but they remained there until they were driven out by the heat. There was no benefit to their being where they were and they needlessly exposed themselves to risk and their gear to unnecessary damage.

3. Getting the first attack line in service is critical. In most cases this is done solely, and without issue, by the first engine. But on other incidents, because of the need for leader lines or the navigation of numerous obstacles, the first engine may need assistance. Personnel often focus so intently on their own unit's task that they walk right by the first engine crew even when it is apparent that the crew needs assistance deploying the first line. On this incident, that help was required to effectively overcome issues with hose advancement.
4. Once the Rapid Intervention Group (RIG) is established, some members may be allowed to do other mission critical, outside duties, so long as the RIG supervisor maintains communication with those personnel and they maintain their readiness to deploy. Some examples of these duties might be: assisting with coordinated ventilation, assuring adequate egress pathways, managing hose lines, and watching for hazardous conditions. On this incident the RIG personnel watched for unsafe conditions but were not assigned other tasks.
5. Direct communications was an issue. One firefighter exited the engine to lay-out at the same time the unit's driver got out to lay-out. The engine Captain called for one line and got another. Then when attempting to correct the error of the first line, a second incorrect line was deployed. This series of errors delayed fire control.
 - a. Officers must work to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable of the various attack lines, their sizes, and the common nomenclature for each.
 - b. Officers must also ensure that all personnel are aware of their particular duties and those duties should (for the sake of consistency) be based on riding position.
 - c. The officer's expectations, and the roles and responsibilities of crew members, should be clearly communicated at line up and reviewed if the personnel assigned to a unit change.
6. Divisions/Groups and other functional command assignments are assigned by command. Units and officers assigned to subordinate positions in the command structure do not supervise other units.
7. When assigning chief officers to interior positions, they should be assigned to a supervisory role over the area or function where the highest level of hazard is. This places a set of eyes and ears that are disengaged from tactile activity to provide objective assessments of fire behavior, conditions, and tactical thought.
8. Command officers should not rely solely on ECC for Incident Duration Reminders (IDRs). This functionality exists on the MDC and should be utilized more often.

9. Given our current level of staffing, to include 4-person engines, it is imperative that the unit officer physically participate in hose line management.
10. The opening, closing and direction of the nozzle is a firefighter skill. The officer cannot effectively supervise this operation if he/she is in front of the nozzle.
11. Non-critical radio messages are often better suited for transmission on 7 Oscar. Doing so frees up air time on the main operations channel. Personnel must remember to switch back to the operations channel.
12. Generally, there is no tactical advantage for truck crews to enter structures ahead of the hose line. Often the claim is that they are going ahead to search or to "find the fire". Neither of these reasons is acceptable in most scenarios. On this incident, the occupants were known to be out and the fire's location was obvious.
13. A single truck driver cannot conduct rapid horizontal ventilation and provide sufficient egress in a timely fashion. Given our truck staffing we simply cannot complete all truck functions simultaneously and are, therefore, forced to prioritize them. When prioritizing truck company functions based on our SOPs, rapid horizontal ventilation is the primary mission, followed by the provision of secondary egress, followed by other truck functions. Horizontal ventilation, or ventilation of any sort, MUST be coordinated with the fire attack.
14. Radio traffic sets the tone for incidents. This is true for the amount, the type, and the manner of delivery for incident information. Unit officers must use their voices to set the tone for calm and methodical operations.
15. The size-up provided for this incident did not meet the requirements of policy direction for the initial on scene report. It is imperative that unit officers provide the right type of information at the right time as it is the framework for all subsequent fire ground decisions.
16. This fire occurred at shift change and the crews were a mixture of personnel from two shifts. This means that, in the absence of standard duties, you open yourself to a situation where different shifts have different expectations of different positions and the inevitable result is confusion. Unit officers must be aware of this dynamic and ensure that the critical mission tasks are met.

Overall Analysis

One of the Fire Chief's expectations is that we flawlessly execute the basics. To do so, we must continuously improve our knowledge and skills through training and practice. To aid this effort, the department has established benchmarks, derived from our policies and standard operating procedures, which define the expectations of our performance. These benchmarks are available to all on Quicklinks and should be incorporated into much of our training. Additionally, we must review our incidents and measure our actions against the benchmarks. Shortcomings that are identified should be addressed by

training. This Post Incident Analysis was developed in the interest of identifying what went right and what went wrong on Burkett Ct so that we might improve our future operations.

Personnel responding to this incident were faced with a rapidly spreading basement fire in a single family home. Many things were done really well and a number of the department's benchmarks were met: water supply instructions were given and followed, units positioned appropriately for the access, command was established, a Side "C" report was given, secondary exits were provided for interior crews, horizontal ventilation was conducted rapidly (although it was not coordinated with the fire attack), searches were completed, and crew integrity was maintained. Other benchmarks were missed: several units failed to meet the expected "turnout time", a "two out" standby team was not established, no initial accountability report was given, and incorrect attack lines were deployed. Small mistakes began to "snowball" but personnel overcame these issues and brought the fire under control.

All personnel, officers and firefighters alike, should become familiar with the benchmarks and strive to meet them on every call. We should utilize them more often in our training. Battalion chiefs or the Duty Operations Chief (DOC) should regularly fill out the benchmark sheets and provide them to officers after calls. Doing these things will enhance our performance and bring us closer to our goal of flawless execution of the basics.



Incident Timeline and Audio (first 50 minutes)

05:40 Units are dispatched
05:43 T719 arrives on scene, establishes command and calls for RID
05:44 E719 arrives and advises E754 of hydrant information. E754 acknowledges
05:44 E701 advises E705 to pick up their hydrant at Monroe and Seminary. E705 acknowledges
05:45 T719 (Command) advises that all occupants are out of the house and that there is an entrance on Side "D"
05:45 E719 asks E754 to charge their line
05:46 T719 (Command and breathing air) reports a fire in the basement
05:47 T719 (Command) directs ECC to have the 3rd due engine take a line to 2nd floor
05:48 E719's officers calls for the 2 inch line to be charged
05:48 T719 (Command) calls for a unit to open the roof
05:49 E701 gives side Charlie report – one story with smoke from the windows
05:49 T719 (Command) relays information about bars on basement windows
05:49 E701 reports that there is no basement access on Side "C"
05:49 E719 calls for more pressure in the attack line
05:50 E719 calls for more pressure for a second time
05:50 E719's driver advises officer to clear kinks from the line
05:51 BC702 arrives and asks Command for an update
05:51 E719's officer instructs driver to charge 2 ½ as soon as he gets water
05:51 BC702 makes second request for an update from Command
05:51 E719's driver asks E754 to boost pressure by 20, then 50 psi
05:52 BC702 assumes Command, updates ECC with structure information, fire conditions, and command post location
05:52 Command makes E719 Basement Division with T719, E754. E719 acknowledges
05:52 Command assigns BC701 as Safety
05:52 Command assigns E701, T716 to Division 2 with E701 as the supervisor. E701 acknowledges
05:52 E701 asks driver to boost the pressure (the driver responds that he is "backing it down")
05:53 Command directs units to knock fire from the outside prior to entering
05:54 Command assigns SA700 to Safety, reassigns BC701 to Division 1
05:55 Command assigns E705 as the RIG group supervisor on Side A
05:55 Command assigns RID (T718, RS741B, and M701) to RIG
05:57 Command asks RS742 for the status of the primary search and utilities
05:58 Command advises Basement Division that things are starting to get "ugly"
05:58 Command to the Basement Division "start flowing some water"
05:58 Command advises Basement and Division 1 of possible flashover conditions, Division 1 acknowledges
05:59 Command assigns E716 to advance another line to the basement
05:59 Command asks basement division for confirmation that two lines (E719's and E754's) are flowing. No answer is received
05:59 Division 1 recommends withdraw if units can not get water on the fire

06:00 Command asks Basement Division for a status report and information about their ability to reach the fire (the answer is garbled and unreadable)

06:00 Command directs Basement Division to withdraw

06:00 Basement confirms they are trying

06:00 Command states that there appears to be some conversion but he is unsure who has water on the fire. He directs the basement division to let him know when they have gotten out.

06:01 Basement division answers that they are out of the building and hitting the fire from Side "A" through basement window.

06:01 AT718 advises that the PEPCO service on the A/D corner has been badly damaged

06:01 Command repeats the message about the PEPCO service and directs all units to stay clear of that area. Safety is asked to cordon the area with fire line tape

06:02 Command asks the basement division (operating outside at this point) to hit the fire running up the outside into the soffit to limit extension into the attic. Basement division acknowledges

06:02 Command warns all units on the fireground of bars on the basement windows and advises he will have a crew (RS741B) remove them

06:04 Command gives the basement division permission to go back down into the basement but advises things are beginning to burn again

06:04 Basement division advises that the first floor in the delta quadrant will likely be soft. Command acknowledges and broadcasts the warning to the fireground.

06:04 Command reiterates what units will be operating on division one and reaffirms that the floor may be weak.

06:05 RS742 advises that all bars have been removed from the windows and that the fire has vented through the Side "C" wall from the basement

06:05 Command advises the basement division of fire in multiple rooms of the basement and reconfirms the units assigned there (E719, E754, E716, AT719)

06:05 Command asks RS742 for a status report on the primary search and utilities. No response.

06:06 Command requests a Task Force for relief purposes

06:06 Command asks division one for the status of the attic above him.

06:07 Basement division calls command with a message but is unreadable. Command asks him to repeat

06:08 Basement division advises that most of the fire in the basement is knocked and asks command how things look from the outside. He also asks E719's operator to switch to "water only" in the green line

06:09 Command advises that things have improved vastly with some fire on the outside, Side "D".

06:09 Command requests an update from division one who states that they are still trying to gain access to the attic but no longer have fire on the first floor.

06:10 Safety advises that the alpha/delta corner has been roped off and that an exterior crew needs to hit some fire on the outside of the building, Side "D".

06:10 Command directs E716 (standing in front of the structure with a line) to drag that line to Side "D" and darken the fire Safety had spoken of.

06:12 Basement calls command but the message is unreadable

06:12 Division one requests help pulling ceilings

06:12 Basement division provides another unreadable, but calm, update

06:13 RS742 reports primary done on first floor and in progress on the basement level. Command asks about utilities and gets the answer "working on them"

06:15 Command has E716 assume the basement division and directs E719 and AT719 to come out. E754 is directed to remain with E716 on the basement level.

06:15 RS742 advises that the primary search has been completed on all levels and they are "getting the utilities now"

06:16 Command asks M701's officer to report to the command post. He is assigned to oversee a rehab area to be established by A701.

06:18 Command updates ECC stating that there had been extensive fire in the basement that had extended to the first floor. The fire is knocked and units will be held for sometime.

06:18 RS742 reports that they will be unable to isolate power due to damage to the panel box.

06:19 Command asks ECC to start PEPCO, Washington Gas, and the fire investigators.

06:19 E719 advises he is out of the building, as is AT719, but he doesn't know where AT719 is

06:19 Command advises that AT719 is in rehab and that a relief crew is waiting at E719

06:19 Command asks Division one for a status report. Division one asks for relief crews

06:20 Command assigns E707, T715 to Division one.

06:22 RS742 advises that the gas has been controlled. Command acknowledges

06:22 Command reminds all personnel about the unstable PEPCO service on the alpha/delta corner

06:23 Division one states that T716 is out and going to rehab

06:23 Command confirms that division one should have E707 and T715. Division one acknowledges

06:24 Command asks Division one if he needs relief. Division one says "I'm okay for now".

06:25 Basement division states that C705D is there and asks if he should assume the division. Command states that C705D was assigned that position sometime ago face to face and should take the division

06:26 Command asks E719 if they have exchanged crews and are "ready to work". E719 answers "yes"

06:26 Command asks E716 if they need relief

06:27 Command asks AT719's officer to report to the command post

06:27 Command tells all units on the fireground to prepare for a PAR.

06:29 The PAR is conducted by division group, and where necessary, single unit. All units and personnel are accounted for.

06:30 Command advises ECC that all units are PAR and that an operator on the channel will no longer be needed.

MCFRS Fire Response Time Detail Report
FULL ASSIGNMENT
Shift Date: 12/01/ 2010
Shift: C

| Unit | Phone To Dispatch Meet (2:00) | Turnout Meet (1:30) | Travel | ** Phone To Onscene Meet (6:20 / 10:20) (7:30 / 11:30) | Cancelled? |
|--|-------------------------------------|------------------------|--------|---|------------|
| 10-0134603 12/02/2010 06:40:30 Box Area: 19-04 5 BURKET CT, MCB | | | | | |
| Call Type: HOUSE FIRE Initial Call Type: HOUSE FIRE | | | | | |
| Phone To Pending: 0:30 Incident Type (Cleared as): 111 Building fire | | | | | |
| A701 | 1:09 Y | 1:26 Y | 4:59 | 7:34 Y | |
| AR716 (TF) | 27:22 | 5:29 | 17:09 | 50:00 | |
| AT718 (RID) | 3:52 | 1:22 Y | 7:05 | 12:19 | |
| AT719 | 1:09 Y | 0:59 Y | 1:52 | 4:00 Y | |
| BC701 | 1:09 Y | 2:49 | 8:17 | 12:15 | |
| BC702 | 4:59 | 0:00 Y | 7:46 | 12:45 | |
| BC704 | 1:09 Y | 3:09 | | | Cancelled |
| C705D | 3:15 | 0:00 Y | 6:45 | 10:00 Y | |
| CT705 (TF) | 27:22 | 21:42 | 15:56 | 65:00 | |
| DC700 | 52:39 | 0:00 Y | 0:11 | 52:50 | |
| E701 | 1:09 Y | 1:31 | 1:30 | 4:10 Y | |
| E702 (TF) | 27:22 | 2:35 | 5:51 | 35:48 | |
| E705 | 1:09 Y | 1:22 Y | 3:29 | 6:00 Y | |
| E707 (TF) | 27:22 | 0:07 Y | 3:18 | 30:47 | |
| E716 | 1:09 Y | 2:05 | 4:53 | 8:07 Y | |
| E719 | 1:09 Y | 1:34 | 0:56 | 3:39 Y | |
| E754 | 1:09 Y | 1:40 | 1:11 | 4:00 Y | |
| FM55 | 20:00 | 1:00 Y | 59:00 | 80:00 | |
| FM58 | 46:27 | 0:00 Y | 7:00 | 53:27 | |
| * FM67 | 1:09 Y | 0:01 Y | 0:00 | 1:10 Y | |
| M701 (RID) | 3:52 | 2:56 | 3:57 | 10:45 | |
| R8741B (RID) | 3:52 | 3:55 | 2:13 | 10:00 Y | |
| R8742 | 1:09 Y | 0:33 Y | 0:00 | 1:42 Y | |
| SA700 | 4:15 | 0:00 Y | 10:45 | 15:00 | |
| T715 (TF) | 27:22 | 4:13 | 0:00 | 31:35 | |
| T716 | 1:09 Y | 0:46 Y | 6:06 | 8:01 Y | |

** = Plan Requirement - Three Engines, One Special Service (Truck / Aerial / RS) and one Chief Unit.
 NFPA1710 - 6:20 minutes for first arriving engine and 10:20 minutes for the remaining units of plan requirement.
 Operations Division Benchmarks - 7:30 minutes for first arriving engine and 11:30 minutes for the remaining units of plan requirement.

* = First Arrival Unit (any type).

Highlighted Unit = First Arriving Engine.

BC702 responded routine when the incident was dispatched and upgraded after replacing BC704.